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Chevron Lite: How Much Deference Should Courts
Give to State Agency Interpretation?
Ann Graham*
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative law scholars and practitioners champion the
Chevron doctrine as the touchstone for analyzing cases involving
judicial review of a federal agency's interpretation of its federal
enabling statute.' The facts of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2 the 1984 United States Supreme
Court case in which the iconic Two Step test was first articulated,
involved a federal court review of the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Air Act (CAA).3 What
this landmark case has to say about the proper standard for judicial
review of a state agency's interpretation of its state law enabling
legislation can be discerned in three ways: (1) through state case
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recognize that state administrative law is a highly practical area of the law that
has escaped the intense analysis targeting federal administrative law. The
collegial debates sparked by this Symposium have created the potential for an
interstate network focusing on state administrative law research and comparative
analysis.
1. Chevron is "the undisputed starting point for any assessment of the
allocation of authority between federal courts and administrative agencies."
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).
2. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and other environmental
groups challenged the EPA's interpretation of the key term "stationary source"
in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685.
Chevron and other manufacturers affected by the EPA's air quality regulation,
which interpreted the statutory term "stationary source" of air pollution,
intervened. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
against the EPA and set aside the regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "the EPA's definition of the term 'source' is a permissible
construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
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law that applies the Chevron doctrine by analogy; (2) through state
statutes that incorporate, modify, or reject Chevron's Two Step
test; or, of course, (3) through scholarly pronouncements about the
extent to which the Chevron analysis should be applied.4
Before discussing the applicability of Chevron's Two Step
analysis at the state level, we should go back to the source. In
Chevron, Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court,
enunciated the following standard, allowing for judicial deference
in the federal arena:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. 5
Despite the apparent clarity of this analytical model, the
Supreme Court itself has not applied the Two Step Chevron
analysis consistently. 6 However, as a starting point, let us assume
4. There is certainly no dearth of case law or law review articles discussing
the Chevron doctrine. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
140 (4th ed. 2002) ("Chevron is one of the most important decisions in the
history of administrative law. It has been cited and applied in more cases than
any other Supreme Court decision in history."). A search of Westlaw's
"Journals and Law Reviews" data base yields 4,319 documents mentioning
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (last viewed
Feb. 13, 2008).
5. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
6. See PIERCE, supra note 4, at 175-91 (discussing inconsistencies in the
Supreme Court's application of the Chevron doctrine through the end of the
Rehnquist Court era); see also Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy
Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60
ADMIN. L. REv. 229 (2008) (discussing eleven cases involving judicial review of
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that the Chevron analysis is as simple as it sounds: Step One-Is
the statutory language clear? Step Two-If the statutory language
is not clear because it is silent or ambiguous, turn to the agency's
construction. If the agency's interpretation is permissible (not the
best or only reading), then a court should defer to the agency's
reading. This is the "strong" form of the Chevron doctrine 7 and
Justice Antonin Scalia is the chief advocate for this straightforward
model.8
Gaps or, more politely, open questions with respect to this
apparently rigid version of Chevron immediately spring to mind. 9
For example, reasonable minds can differ about whether a word is
clear. Can a court avoid application of Chevron deference
altogether by finding no ambiguity and declaring that there is only
one reading of the statute-the court's reading-no matter what
the agency says? Justice Scalia is particularly blunt about finding
his definition of a statutory term to be the only one worth
considering.' 0 Even though he supports the strong version of the
agency interpretation of federal statutes that were decided during the first two
terms of the Roberts Court, and concluding that a classic Chevron analysis was
followed in only one of the eleven cases). In its third term, the Roberts Court
has delivered one Chevron-related opinion to date, issued February 27, 2008:
Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008).
7. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 302-03
(1988) (discussing the "strong" and "weak" forms of Chevron analysis).
8. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 826
(2006).
9. Certain basic philosophical questions cry for resolution, but fall outside
the scope of this article. For example: What is the appropriate line between the
judicial responsibility to say what the law is and congressional delegation to an
agency to implement a statute, which necessarily requires the agency to interpret
and apply the statute? Must congressional delegation to an agency be express or
may it be implied? What difference does the form of the agency interpretation
make, on a continuum from internal agency memorandum to formal notice-and-
comment rulemaking? Should the courts give closer scrutiny to an agency
interpretation that preempts state law or expands the agency's jurisdiction?
10. See, for example, Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), in
which Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, referred to "the only natural
definition of the term 'waters,"' id. at 731, "common sense and common usage,"
id. at 732 n.5, "the commonsense understanding of the term," id. at 734, and the
"plain language of the statute," id., to support overturning the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers' broad interpretation of the Clean Water Act (CWA) term
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Chevron analysis, his opinions frequently fail to reach Step Two
because he finds no ambiguity."I
The textualist 2 or plain meaning 13 version of the Chevron
doctrine has its critics, not the least of which is Justice Stephen
Breyer. 15 He argued for a more flexible analysis before joining the
Supreme Court 16 and continues to express similar views today in
cases that come before the Court. His preferred method has been
called an intentionalist 17 inquiry--focusing on the intent of
Congress 18 and allowing courts (at least the Supreme Court) to
examine legislative history, the purpose of the statute, regulatory
context, and other factors.
The logical extension of this "intentionalist" model is to throw
out any real reliance on agency interpretation to the point of
eliminating the need for Chevron's Two Step analysis altogether.
Indeed, the Roberts Court seems to be moving away from Chevron
(even when its opinions cite it) and back to the earlier Skidmore
"waters," which would have included wetlands not adjacent to any relatively
permanent standing or flowing bodies of water.
11. "One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds
less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists." Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE
L.J. 511, 521 (1989). This article predates Justice Scalia's appointment to the
Supreme Court, but his viewpoint has not changed.
12. See generally Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the
Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REv. 393 (1996);
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) (discussing an approach to judicial review in which
the court conducts its reading of the words of the statute).
13. See generally Miles & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 828-29 (finding that
Justices Scalia and Thomas are the major proponents of the "plain meaning"
approach).
14. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995).
15. See Graham, supra note 6, at 233-35 (contrasting Justice Breyer's
flexible or "weak" reading of Chevron with Justice Scalia's "simple" or "strong"
version).
16. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 363 (1986).
17. See Linda Jellum, Chevron's Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy
to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 725, 743-48 (2007).
18. Chevron itself says that if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end




test.19 Skidmore calls for a case-by-case, facts-and-circumstances
review of agency interpretation-and a return to this approach is
not necessarily bad. In fact, if the Supreme Court is not following
a clear version of the Chevron doctrine, the interest of
predictability would be better served by declaring Chevron dead
20
and spelling out factors that are likely to give an agency
interpretation the power to persuade under Skidmore.
The purpose of this article is to analyze state case law and
statutes to determine the range of state court deference to state
agency interpretation of state law. Initially, I hold up the basic
Chevron Two Step doctrine as a template. for exploring the range
of deference given to state agencies. More importantly, since I
find that the Roberts Court is not applying Chevron consistently,
21
I argue that states could provide ideas for replacement of the
Chevron doctrine at the federal level. The analytical approach in
this article is threefold: (1) to examine existing state models for
judicial review of state agency interpretations of state statutes; (2)
to make recommendations about the most effective approach on a
state level; and (3) to identify state concepts, procedures, and
standards that could be imported to the federal arena.
II. A CONTINUUM OF STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
STATE AGENCIES
Existing state models range along a continuum from express
adoption of the Chevron doctrine to outright rejection of Chevron's
applicability. A middle ground approach sounds very much like
the federal Skidmore test22-ncluding the agency's viewpoint as
19. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("[T]he rulings,
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.").
20. See Graham, supra note 6, at 270-72. See generally Jellum, supra note 17.
21. Graham, supra note 6.
22. Courts will weigh an agency interpretation of a statute in light of the
facts and circumstances and grant judicial deference to the extent the agency




one factor to be considered by a court reviewing an agency's
interpretation. Several states in this middle category improve on
Skidmore by listing factors, which include the state agency
interpretation, to be considered in reviewing state statutes.
A. Texas Statutory Standard and Case Law: Specific State Factors
for Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of State Law
Texas occupies the middle ground of our continuum, neither
rejecting nor parroting the Chevron doctrine. A key point in the
Texas standard is the statutorily enumerated factors to be
considered by courts when reviewing state agency interpretation.
The Texas Government Code contains two notable provisions.
First, as with the Chevron doctrine, the intent of the legislature
is critical in determining the meaning of statutory terms: "In
interpreting a statute, a court shall diligently attempt to ascertain
legislative intent and shall consider at all times the old law, the
evil, and the remedy." 23 This provision incorporates not only the
Chevron focus on legislative intent but also the legislative history
inquiry favored by Justice Breyer.
24
Second, Texas avoids the Chevron Step One problem of
requiring the reviewing court to determine whether the statute is
silent or ambiguous. This also eliminates any temptation for the
court to adopt Justice Scalia's tactic of dodging Chevron deference
by employing his own reading of a statutory term to find the statute
unambiguous and excluding any question of deference to the
agency. 25  The Texas Government Code provides courts and
litigants with valuable predictability as it lists specific statutory
construction aids--and provides that agency interpretation of a
statute is only one factor:
In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is
considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider
4mong other matters the: object sought to be attained;
circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
legislative history; common law or former statutoryI
23. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 312.005 (Vernon 2005).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
25. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
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provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects;
consequences of a particular construction; administrative
construction of the statute; and title (caption), preamble,
and emergency provision.26
The Texas Supreme Court has discussed the appropriate degree of
deference owed to an agency's interpretation of the statute it
administers in significant cases, beginning with the Stanford v.
Butler standard established in 1944.27 The level of deference
afforded in subsequent cases ranges from "great weight ' 28 to
"some deference ' 29 to "no deference." 30
In a 2007 opinion, the Texas Supreme Court issued its most
recent consideration of state court deference to a state agency's
interpretation of state statute. Mid-Century Insurance Co. v.
Ademaj3 1  involved the Texas Insurance Commissioner's
interpretation of provisions of the Texas Insurance Code embodied
in a formal rule. In upholding the Insurance Commissioner's
interpretation, the Texas Supreme Court quoted from its own 1993
opinion in Tarrant Appraisal District v. Moore: "Construction of a
26. TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (Vernon 2005).
27. "[C]ourts will ordinarily adopt and uphold a construction placed upon a
statute by a . . . department charged with its administration if the statute is
ambiguous or uncertain, and the construction ... is reasonable." Stanford v.
Butler, 181 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. 1944) (involving Texas Supreme Court
deference to the Texas Secretary of State's interpretation of a Texas statute
regarding election procedures for presidential electors for the State of Texas).
28. Tex. Ass'n of Long Distance Tel. Cos. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 798
S.W.2d 875, 884 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990) (involving judicial deference to the
PUC interpretation of a statute in a telephone rate setting case).
29. TXU Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 51 S.W.3d 275 (Tex. 2001)
(involving judicial deference to the PUC's reasonable interpretation of
provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Act).
30. City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1998) (involving
interpretation of the Texas statutory standard of care for emergency vehicle
drivers). In that case, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected the statutory
interpretation put forward by the fire truck driver's employer, City of Amarillo,
saying, "[W]e remain convinced that the City's proposed statutory construction
is not supported by existing case law." City of Amarillo v. Martin, 912 S.W.2d
349, 353 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995). Although the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals decision, it also did not afford or discuss agency
deference. Instead of deference, the Texas Supreme Court conducted its own
statutory analysis, looking to traditional factors such as plain language,
legislative history, the statute in its entirety, public policy, and interpretations
from other states with similar statutes. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426.
31. 243 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2007).
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statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement
is entitled to serious consideration, so long as the construction is
reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the
statute."
32
Note that the range of deference expressed in Texas case law
accords with the Texas Government Code requirement that courts
are to take account of agency interpretation as only one factor,
even if it is to be given "serious consideration." The Texas test
also requires that the agency interpretation be "reasonable and not
contradict the plain language of the statute." The requirement of a
reasonable interpretation is a greater check on agencies than the
Chevron requirement of "permissible," although the U.S. Supreme
Court itself sometimes uses the term "reasonable." 33 Indeed, the
"permissible" yardstick has left federal courts between a rock and a
hard place. Following the Chevron test can mean upholding an
agency interpretation that the court believes to be incorrect, as long
as the agency advances even a shred of justification for its
interpretation. I believe that this dilemma is one root cause of the
U.S. Supreme Court's unwillingness to follow the Chevron
analysis consistently.
34
32. 845 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex. 1993). By footnote, the Texas Supreme
Court refers to its history of deference to state agency interpretation, including:
State v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. 1994) ("[T]he
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged
with its enforcement is entitled to great weight."); Tex. Employer's Ass'n v.
Holmes, 196 S.W.2d 390, 395 (Tex. 1946) ("[T]he practical interpretation of the
Act by the agency charged with the duty of administering it is entitled to the
highest respect from the courts."); Stanford v. Butler, 181 S.W.2d 269, 273, 322
n.7 (Tex. 1944) ("The contemporaneous construction of an act by those who are
charged with the duty of its enforcement ... is worthy of serious consideration
as an aid to interpretation, particularly where such construction has been
sanctioned by long acquiescence." (quoting 39 TEX. JUR. STAT. § 125 (1936))).
33. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv.,
545 U.S. 967, 969 (2005) (in which Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, noted
that "Chevron requires a federal court to defer to an agency's construction, even
if it differs from what the court believes to be the best interpretation, if the
particular statute is within the agency's jurisdiction to administer, the statute is
ambiguous on the point at issue, and the agency's construction is reasonable."
(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 & n. 11, 865-66 (2006))).
34. PIERCE, supra note 4, at 15, notes that there is "solid empirical evidence
that judges and Justices continue to differ with respect to their interpretations of
agency-administered statutes and of their willingness to substitute their
interpretations for those of agencies." Pierce refers to the 2006 Miles &
Sunstein study, supra note 8, and concludes that it documents "the unfortunate
1112 [Vo!. 68
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The U.S. Fifth Circuit opinion in Wells Fargo Bank of Texas
N.A. v. James35 is a good example of reluctant judicial support for
an unpalatable federal agency interpretation. The case involved
preemption of a Texas consumer protection statute36 by an Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) interpretation. After
finding that Congress had delegated to the OCC the authority to
regulate fees charged by national banks, the Fifth Circuit
determined that it was bound to defer to the agency's definition of
fees chargeable to "customers," which included, according to the
OCC, non-account holders who sought to cash "on-us" checks
(precisely the type of wage-earner that the Texas "par value" statue
was attempting to protect--one who has no bank account of his
own but needs to cash his paycheck at his employer's bank without
penalty).
The Fifth Circuit viewed its role as limited to discerning
whether Congress had delegated rulemaking authority to the
agency, "not whether we think such a delegation wise." 37  The
court deferred to the OCC's strained interpretation of its own
regulation under Chevron and Auer v. Robbins.38  The court
recognized that the OCC's interpretation "is not the only
reasonable interpretation of [the regulation], and it is perhaps not
even the most natural reading of 'customer."' 39 The Fifth Circuit
tendency of judges and Justices to decide many administrative law statutory
interpretation disputes based on their personal beliefs even in the presence of the
consistency-enhancing Chevron test." PIERCE, supra note 4, at 15. On the basis
of my study of Roberts Court opinions, I agree that the Justices do substitute
their interpretations for those of agencies-while cloaking their opinions in
Chevron terminology, or while dodging Chevron altogether. See Graham, supra
note 6. With Chevron, we are merely pretending to limit judicial review with an
overly deferential test that does not provide consistency and begs to be flaunted.
See conclusions infra Part Ill.
35. 321 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2003).
36. The Texas "par value" statute, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.112(a)
(Vernon 2005), required that a payor bank pay checks drawn on it at the full face
value of the check (without deducting a check cashing fee) even if the payee was
a non-account holder with the payor bank.
37. Wells Fargo, 321 F.3d at 494.
38. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Auer v. Robbins represents the U.S. Supreme
Court standard prescribing deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations, whereas Chevron prescribes deference to agency interpretation of
statute.
39. Wells Fargo, 321 F.3d at 495.
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seemed to invite Congress to step in and correct the resulting
preemption of a state consumer protection statute: "Of course,
should Congress be dissatisfied with the OCC's decision
concerning the fee at issue here, Congress is free to revisit the
question with subsequent legislation.
'AO
Had the Wells Fargo case been decided in accordance with
Texas deference standards, with agency interpretation being only
one factor in the analysis, the outcome could have been very
different. The contrast between the Texas standard and the
Chevron doctrine reflects two schools of thought about the proper
role for judicial review: stringent substantive examination of
agency decision-making or procedural review under a deferential
standard of "reasonableness.'"4 1 This is not a new debate, but one
well worth revisiting. Ultimately, core issues regarding separation
of powers among the legislative, executive (including
administrative agencies), and judicial branches of government as
well as the proper balance between the power of the federal
government and the states need to be reevaluated.42
Before concluding this overview of Texas' jurisprudential
deference standards regarding agency interpretations, I note the
2003 Austin Court of Appeals 43 opinion in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Texas Council on Environmental Quality.44 Phillips expressly
cited and relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron
to support deference to a Texas administrative agency's
interpretation of a Texas environmental statute:
[I]f there is room for a policy determination in the rule, we
will defer to the agency's interpretation unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the rule.
40. Id. at 494.
41. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW &
PROCESS 386-93 (3d ed. 1999).
42. Although I hope not to be accused of searching for a silver lining in the
very dark cloud that is the subprime mortgage collapse, I suggest that this could
be the trigger for a re-examination of judicial deference to aggressive federal
agency preemption of state consumer protection statutes.
43. Because of its location in the state capital of Austin, the Austin Court of
Appeals is to Texas administrative law as the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is to
federal administrative law. This court is usually deemed an expert in
administrative law because of the volume of administrative cases that come
before it.
44. 121 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003).
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Our task is to determine whether an agency's decision is
based on a permissible interpretation of its statutory
scheme. Because the interpretation represents the view of
the regulatory body that drafted and administers the rule,
the agency interpretation, if reasonable, becomes a part of
the rule itself.
45
Because Texas has such well-developed statutory and case law
standards for appropriate judicial deference to agency
interpretations without reference to a federal model, reliance on
Chevron in the Phillips Petroleum case was unexpected. However,
other states do expressly rely on importation of the Chevron
doctrine.
B. Illinois: Using Chevron Deference if the Court Agrees with the
Agency's Interpretation
Illinois courts have taken a page from the U.S. Supreme
Court's playbook: citing Chevron but reaching the result the court
believes to be correct. The Illinois Supreme Court used Chevron
as its own standard for reviewing a state agency's statutory
interpretation in Church v. State of Illinois.46 Although the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois Department of
Professional Regulation was entitled to deference and had
appropriately interpreted the state's Private Detective, Private
Alarm and Private Security Act, it held the Act itself
unconstitutional.
In two recent intermediate appellate court opinions,47 Chevron
and prior Illinois cases citing Chevron received mention. In both
cases, however, the courts explained that if the statute is
unambiguous (according to the court's reading), there is no
deference. This sounds very much like the U.S. Supreme Court's
application of the Chevron doctrine.
45. Id. at 508 (citations omitted).
46. Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572 (I11. 1995).
47. Quality Saw & Seal, Inc., v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 871 N.E.2d 260
(I11. App. 2d. Dist. 2007); Dusthimer v. Bd. of Trustees, 857 N.E.2d 343 (Ill.
App. 4th Dist. 2006).
2008] 1115
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C. Florida: Chevron or Nothing
Florida would have been slotted into the "Chevron by
adoption" column until the Florida Supreme Court weighed in with
its 2006 opinion in McKenzie Check Advance of Florida v. Betts.48
After McKenzie, lower courts are still following Chevron, but the
Florida Supreme Court grants the agencies no deference.
The issue before the Florida Supreme Court in McKenzie was
whether "deferred presentment checks" (a type of "payday
lending" in which an individual gives a check cashing company a
postdated check in exchange for an advance of the face amount of
the check plus fees) were governed by Florida's usury statutes.
This case considered transactions that occurred after enactment of
the 1994 Florida Money Transmitters' Code, which was
inconclusive concerning regulation of deferred presentment
checks, and before legislative amendments in 2001, which
expressly permit deferred presentment check transactions subject
to certain limitations. During this interim period, the Florida
Department of Banking and Finance, the state agency charged with
interpreting and enforcing the Money Transmitters' Code, adopted
rules49 that allowed deferred presentment checks and imposed
limitations, which, if valid and complied with, would take the
checks out of the coverage of general usury laws.
In McKenzie, the Florida Supreme Court ignored the state
agency's interpretation of the state statute and turned instead to a
de novo review of the 1994 Florida statute, taking account of other
factors including "plain language, 50 and interpretations by other
state courts concerning deferred presentment transactions. The
Florida Supreme Court came to a different conclusion than the
Department of Banking and Finance about statutory authorization
for-and regulation of-this type of loan under the 1994 state
statute. The majority opinion barely acknowledged that the
Department had a different interpretation; rather, it was the
dissenting opinion that invoked "our many precedents deferring to
48. 928 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 2006).
49. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 3C-560.801-4 (repealed 2001).
50. McKenzie, 928 So. 2d at 1208.
51. Id. at 1211.
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an implementing agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute,"52
noting that "[t]his interpretation reasonably clarifies a statutory
ambiguity and falls squarely within the Department's area of
expertise." 53  While perhaps askew of Florida's precedents
regarding deference, the majority opinion is not out of line with the
federal standard inasmuch as my review of U.S. Supreme Court
cases during the first two terms of the Roberts Court indicates that
the U.S. Supreme Court itself frequently avoids a classic Chevron
deference analysis in favor of its own independent review coupled
with traditional factors such as plain language, legislative history,
and purpose of the statutory scheme.
54
Florida's standard is characterized as "Chevron or nothing"
because, while the Florida Supreme Court goes forth on its own
with no reliance on deference, either under Chevron or under
Florida case law, lower courts grant deference based explicitly on
the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Chevron. State Department of
Agriculture v. Sun Gardens Citrus, LLP 55 is a clear example. In
upholding the statutory interpretation of the state agency, the court
quoted extensively from Chevron56 and relied on 1983 and 1994
Florida Supreme Court opinions to support its conclusion that
"[t]rial courts must afford great deference to an agency's or
department's interpretation of a rule it promulgated concerning
matters that are administered by that agency or department.
' 57
Even after the Florida Supreme Court opinion in McKenzie, the
Florida Appeals Court for the Second District (the same court that
issued the Sun Gardens opinion) has continued to defer to the
Secretary of State as the agency to which the Florida Legislature
has delegated authority to interpret the Florida Election Code. In
Browning v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc.58 it
announced that under Florida case law, "the administrative
52. Id. at 1212.
53. Id.
54. See Graham, supra note 6, at 271-72 (concluding, "In an unmistakable
pattern, Chevron has become the argument for the losing side, with failure by
the majority to adhere to a straightforward Chevron analysis emerging as a
recurring criticism in dissenting opinions.").
55. 780 So. 2d 922 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2001).
56. Id. at 925-26.
57. Id. at 925 (citations omitted).
58. 968 So. 2d 637 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2007).
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'construction of a statute by the agency charged with its
enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great weight."' 59
The Browning court was aware of the Florida Supreme Court
opinion in McKenzie, citing it only for the proposition that "courts
may consider later amendments to statutes in determining
legislative intent." 60 The Florida Supreme Court does have another
opportunity in this case to restate the Florida standard regarding
deference to state agency interpretation of Florida statutes, because
the Browning court certified a question concerning interpretation
of the Florida Election Code to the Florida Supreme Court. 6 1 If we
watch this case, the Florida justices may tell us clearly whether it is
Chevron or nothing in terms of deference under the Florida
standard.
D. Delaware: An Explicit Rejection of Chevron
Delaware's Supreme Court struck a blow for independence from
the Chevron doctrine in Public Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale.62
In reviewing a challenge to the Delaware Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Control's interpretation of a Delaware
statute governing potable water permits,63 the Delaware Supreme
Court overruled its own prior opinion in Eastern Shore Natural
Gas Co. v. Delaware Public Service Commission,64 which
articulated an agency deference standard.65  The Delaware
Supreme Court found the prior standard "overly deferential and
confusing." 66 Expressly declining to adopt the federal Chevron
standard, the Delaware Supreme Court instead examined the state
59. Id. at 648 (quoting PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 283 (Fla.
1988); citing also Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. App.
2d Dist. 1991)).
60. Id. at 649 n.9. Oddly enough the Florida Court of Appeals for the Third
District, in an as yet unreleased opinion, relied on the dissenting opinion in
McKenzie to support judicial deference to an agency interpretation of the Florida
statute governing certification of professional engineers. Risov v. State Bd. of
Prof'l Eng'rs, No. 3D07-1929 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. Feb. 6, 2008).
61. Browning, 968 So. 2d at 654.
62. 735 A.2d 378 (Del. 1999).
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 6077(b).
64. Pub. Water Supply, 735 A.2d at 382.
65. 637 A.2d 10 (Del. 1994).
66. Pub. Water Supply, 735 A.2d at 382.
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agency interpretation of the state statutory provision at issue using
a de novo review standard.
III. CONCLUSION
Predictability is the Holy Grail of the legal profession.
Whether we as lawyers represent a state agency, a regulated entity,
or an affected business or individual, we can best advise our clients
if we can anticipate the outcome of litigation. At the federal level,
predictability presently seems beyond the reach of the Roberts
Court. The Chevron doctrine does not currently represent a
coherent, consistent standard that federal courts can be expected to
apply when reviewing a federal agency's interpretation of its
enabling statute.
The states have been called laboratories for innovation, and
confusion in the federal arena may present an opportunity not to
simply lay Chevron out for a decent burial but to find a reliable
replacement. I recommend consideration of the Texas model: a
facts-and-circumstances review of agency interpretation like the
federal Skidmore test, but with the relevant factors clearly
enumerated. Factors should include: agency interpretation, plain
language, legislative history, consistency with legislative purpose
and the regulatory scheme, case law from other jurisdictions, and a
catch-all category of "other considerations." We need to give our
justices and judges in the states and in the hallowed halls of the
U.S. Supreme Court, an opportunity to be honest. If judges are
conducting their own interpretations of statutes behind a veil, we
need them to step into the light. If Chevron is "out," say so and
establish a clean new standard.
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